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IN THE SUP·REME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CARBON CANAL COMPANY, a corporation, et al,
Appellants,
-vs.SANPETE \\7ATER USERS ASSOCIATION, a corporation, and WAYNE
D. CRIDDLE, State Engineer of the
State of Utah,
Respondents,

'
Case No.
9133

1TNITED STATES STEEL ·CORPORATION, a corporation,
Intervenor.

BRIEF of RESPONDENT'S
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
On December 1, 1958, Plaintiffs filed an action in
the District Court of Sanpete County seeking to have
that Court reverse a decision theretofore made by the
State Engineer, under date of October 7, 1958, granting
an extension of time to the Sanpete Water Users Association to and including January 31, 1961 in which to
submit proof of the construction of the works and the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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application of water to beneficial use under Application No. 9593 on file in the office of the State Engineer.
(R. 1-9). The Court affirmed the decision of the State
Engineer with respect to granting the extension of time
but provided that the Sanpete Water Users Association
(hereinafter referred to as Applicant) would be given
a period of two years "from the date that this order
shall become final by lapse of time in which to file
an appeal therefrom, or in the event an appeal is
taken to the Supreme Court, from the date of the issuance by said court of the remittitur on final judginent
affirming this judgment.'' (R. 30) The Court also attached certain conditions to its order, which conditions
are being complied with. (R. 31). Plaintiffs (hereinafter
referred to as Appellants have appealed from the
decision of the lower court upon the ground that the
evidence was insufficient to sustain the judgment. The
statement of facts contained in Appellants' brief does
not give a fair state1nent of the facts, but appears to
be argumentative and states the evidence most favorable
to Appellants. For that reason, Applicant \viii restate
the evidence as it appears in the record.
STATEl\!ENT OF FACTS
Application nu1nber 9593 (being the application involved in this case) was originally filed on September
11, 192± by John L. Bench of Fairview, Utah, "for
and in behalf of the "Tater users of Sanpete County."
The application sought to appropriate 15,000 acre feet
of water from Gooseberry ·Creek located in Sanpete
Oounty by constructing a dam across the creek at ''That
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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is kno,vn as the "Narrows" site, (Exhibit 3). Since the
filing of this application, the project has been known
generally as the Gooseberry Project.
The day after the filing of Application 9593, a
~Ir. E. B. Jorgensen made an application designated
as 9594 (which application was later assigned to the Price
River Water Conservancy District) seeking to appropriate 90,000 acre feet of water from Fish Creek, of
'vhich Gooseberry Creek is a tributary. This application
seeks appopriation at a point lower on the stream than
the application 9593, (Exhibit 1). Application 9594 is
now owned by the United States of America pursuant to
an assignment made by the Price River Water Conservancy District under date of May 6, 1946 (Exhibit 23). It is
interesting to note that although Appellants in this
case claim Applicant did not show diligence in proceeding to construct the Gooseberry dam and putting the
water to beneficial use up until the time of the assignment to the Federal Government in 1946 the Price
River Water Conservancy District (one of Appellants
herein) had not even advertised as required by Section
73-3-6 U.C.A. 1953 which is one of the first steps toward
obtaining approval of the application. (R. 133)
The State Engineer originally rejected Application
9593 from which decision an appeal was taken to the
District Court of Sanpete County. While the matter
was pending in the court and prior to the time that
either party brought the matter on for hearing, the
Sanpete ·County interests endeavored to obtained financing for the construction of the Gooseberry project.
Plans w·ere drawn up for the construction of the tunnel
3
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phase of the project and were actually submitted to
Washington for approval so that public funds, either
under the Works Progress Administration or the CaseWheeler Act might be made available to assist in the
development of the project, (R. 88, Exhibit 7). However,
it was then learned that the appeal from the State Engineer to the district court had never been resolved so
that the matter was immediately brought to trial and
hearing, (R. 88, 89).
After hearing the appeal from the State Engineer's
decision, the district court, on February 11, 1939, made
and entered its Findings of Fact in which it found
among other things :

"13. ·That the lands owned by the plaintiff,
and by the parties in whose interest said application was made, hereinabove referred to, are arid,
and, without the application for irrigation, are
sterile and unproductive, but ,~vith water for the
irrigation thereof they can, and will be, made
productive, and upon which crops of all kinds
that are raised on similar lands in the State of
Utah can be produced; that the water supply
available for the irrigation of the said lands
hereinabove referred to and heretofore appropriated for the purpose of irrigating the same
is insufficient and the waters sought to be appropriated by the application 9593 are necessary
in order to supply a full a1nount of \Vater to
properly irrigate the said lands; that the entire
amount sought to be appropriated, together with
the water right now available for the irrigation
of said lands, \vill not be 1nore than sufficient
to irrigate the sa1ne.

"1-l-. The Court further finds that at the
time of the filing of said application numbered
4
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9593, there was unappropriated water in the said
Gooseberry Creek at the point where it is sought
to store said water and to divert the same from
said Gooseberry Creek, and that from time to
time and from year to year, and has ever since
that time been water over and above all prior
appropriation5 -and subject to be appropriated
under said application, and that no rights of
the defendants, or either of them, will be prejudiced by the granting and approval of the said
application of the plaintiff, John L. Bench, number 9593, and that the said plaintiff is entitled
to have his application approved and to have such
approval made of record in the State Engineer's
office of the State of Utah.
"15. The Court further finds that the action
of the State Engineer of the State of Utah in
rejecting and denying the application of the plaintiff herein, numbered 9593, was arbitrary and in
violation of the rights of the said plaintiff, John
L. Bench, and that the allowance of said application and the prosecution of the appropriation
therein proposed will not injure or impair the
vailue of the existing rights of the defendants,
or either of them, nor will the same interfere
with any more beneficial use of the waters of
sad Gooseberry Creek sought to be appropriated
by said application, nor any other rights whatsoever, nor will such appropriation and use as
proposed in said application number 9593 be detrimental to the public welfare nor interfere with
any prior applications or existing rights of the
defendants herein, or either of them." (Exhibit 2)
Respondents have felt it necessary to set forth
verbatim the findings of the Court in regard to the
matter of the approval of the application because of
the attempt on the part of Appellants to raise an
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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issue as to availability of water. However, the decision
of the lower court was not appealed and therefore
the matter in respect to the above findings is now res
judicata as to any claim or issue as to the insufficiency
of the water supply to be appropriated under the application number 9593.
Too, under the provisions of Section 73-3-12, U.C.A.
1953, time in which to prove up on the application commences to run from the date of the approval of such
application and the State Engineer is authorized to
grant extensions not exceeding 14 years "after the date
of approval." Likewise, because Appellants have made
considerable point of the fact that nothing was apparently done to commence construction during the period
1924 through 1939, we should point out to the Court
that Section 73-3-10 U:C.A. 1953, provides:
"If the application is rejected, the applicant
shall take no steps toward the prosecution of the
proposed work or the diversion or use of the
public "\Vater so long as such rejection shall continue in force."
Immediately after the decision "\vas rendered by the
District Court requiring the State Engineer to approve
the application, the Sanpete interests proceeded to obtain the approval of plans for the construction of the
project and by 1941-42 'vere in the process of surveying
and making appraisal of the rights of way to be acquired for canals and the tunnel "Then \Vorld War II
commenced, (R. 65). Obviously, the advent of war put
a stop to any further developn1ent of any irrigation
projects including a sister project called the Scofield
6
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Project on the Price River, (R. 67). For many years
prior to World War II, the Bureau of Reclamation
had been very interested in the development of the
Price River and had from time to time made surveys
of various irrigation and storage projects along the
Price River and its tributaries, including Gooseberry
Creek where the proposed Gooseberry reservoir was
to be constructed. In the course of its surveys, the
Bureau of Reclamation had tied together two projects
kno,vn as Scofield and Gooseberry. The Scofield Reservoir is located several miles below the Gooseberry Project and there had actually been a dam constructed on
the Price River at this point, (R. 102). Exhibit 10 outlines the various studies and reports made by the Bureau
of Reclamation on the Price River from August 15,
1917 to 1941, in respect to the proposed Gooseberry
Project. Several reports have been filed since that time.
(See Exhibits 12, 14 and 15).
Even though World War II put a stop to civilian
construction of projects such as the Gooseberry Project,
the ,Carbon County interests took advantage of what
appeared to be an emergency and urged the Federal
Government to step in and rebuild the Scofield Dan1
on the Price River because of the threat of damage to
the transportation facilities of the D. & R.G.W. Railroad should the Scofield Dam either go out or should
it be sabotaged. A meeting was held at Salt Lake City,
Utah, in 1942 at which representatives of the State, the
Bureau of Reclamation, the railroads, Carbon County
groups and the Sanpete County interests were present
by invitation and participated in the discussion, (R. 68,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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72) Mr. Jerman, representing the Bureau of Reclamation recounted the history of the Gooseberry and Scofield projects at this meeting and stated that they
both should be constructed as one project and that the
Bureau had been hopeful that they could have been
constructed from public funds, but in view of the emergency that now confronted the people, he hoped that
the Sanpete interests would defer going ahead with
the Gooseberry project and allow the Carbon ·County
people to construct the Scofield project with government
funds if that were possible, (R. 83). Others, including
J. Bracken Lee, then Mayor of Price, discussed the
need for rebuilding the Scofield Reservoir, (R. 83).
Finally, Mr. Elmo Irons, representing the Sanpete
group, stated that if the keeping of the two projects
in one program would hinder the rebuilding of the
Scofield dam, the Sanpete interests would step aside
and permit the Scofield dam to be constructed as
the first unit of a single project and "then when the
time came that Gooseberry could go ahead, then the
other unit of the single project would be constructed,"
(R. 84).
Following this meeting, approval was given for the
rebuilding of the Scofield dam, which \Vas done during
the years 1943 to 1946. The cost of the dam was approximately one 1nillion dollars, of \vhich the Carbon
County water users (prin1arily the Appellants herein)
paid one hundred thousand dollars, and the balance
was paid by the Federal Governn1ent, (R. 116, 128).
In connection with the rebuilding of the Scofield Reservoir, a contract was entered into between the United

8
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States and the Carbon Water Conservancy District and
Priee River Water Conservancy District relating to
the construction of the Scofield dam and the subsequent development of the Gooseberry Project. (Exhibit
13). This agreement, commonly referred to as the Tripartite agreement, sets out that "the United States
proposes, as the principal feature of the diversion plan
(herein called the Gooseberry Plan) to build storage
and diversion \vorks on the Price River system at a
point or points above the confluence of the Cabin Hollow
Creek and Gooseberry Creek.'' The agreement further
identifies the Gooseberry project as a part of the entire
progra1n for developn1ent of the Price River and the
irrigation district, under paragraph 13 (b) stipulates
that its Application numbered 9594 will be assigned
to the United States and also that its right under application 1035 ('Certificates No. 2046, 8989A, 13334)
are to be subordinated to the rights of the United
States in connection with the development of the Gooseberry project. (Exhibit 13, p. 5).
Following the close of World War II, the Sanpete
County interests began to formulate plans and to take
steps to initiate the construction of the tunnel as the
first phase of the Project. An application was made in
1948 to the Utah Water and Power Board for a loan
of Ninety Thousand Dollars which loan, together with
private funds available, would be sufficient to construct
the tunnel. (R. 141-143) However, at that time the
Bureau of Reclamation stepped in and requested that
the Sanpete people defer the construction of the Gooseberry project at what has been commonly described
9
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as the "Narrows" site and to permit the Bureau of
Reclamation to proceed on a larger project being worked
on by the Bureau at what is knovvn as the "Mammoth"
site, a location somewhat downstream and one which
would produce substantially more water for irrigation
in Sanpete County. The Bureau's action of course was
taken under its rights given by the Tri-partite agreement executed with the Carbon County Water Conservancy District and Price River Water Conservancy
District in 1943. Consequently, after a meeting with the
Utah Water and Power Board, the Sanpete interests
gave up the loan which had been approved and authorized the Bureau to proceed with its plans for the
construction of the larger project. (R. 141-144).
In August of 1950, Applicant filed a request for
an extension of time stating:
"Original Surveys were made, test pits dug,
ground cleared of underbrush. The Bureau of
Reclamation proposed to build a dam and tunnel
to use the water covered by this and other applications; more than $20,000.00 was spent to
explore the foundation conditions at the dam site,
to drill four holes vvith diamond drill to test
ground through which tunnel is to be drilled.
Distributions location also surveyed. Land and
water use study made in the area. Construction
was stopped by ,.\T orld ,,-.-ar II, and agreement
was made with the Bureau of Reclamation, and
other government agencies that \vith the enlargement of the Scofield Reservoir the dam to impound the water under this application should
next be built, but funds were withdrawn by
government order on account of the war; the
Utah Water and Power Board then allocated
$90,000.00 to begin the dam and tunnel, P,nd

10
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$2,000.00 was spent in further exploration work.
The Bureau of Reclamation then proposed to
build the extensive projects on the Colorado
River system, including the Echo Park and the
Central Utah projects and tied this project of
'vhich this water right is the base into the Colorado Projects and the Central Utah. Under this
condition work was temporarily suspended, and
the $90,000 turned back.
"The nature, extent and estimated cost of
construction remaining to be done to complete
the work in accordance with the application follows:
"It is proposed to complete construction of
a dam on the Gooseberry Creek with tunnel for
transmountain diversion, and districtuion canals
and works, at an estimate cost of approximately
$2,000,000.00, the project to be tied in with the
Projects on the Colorado River and the Central
Utah from financial and administrative standpoint; if these projects are not developed in the
next very few years, it is proposed to complete
the dam and tunnel in cooperation with the Utah
Water and Power Board." (Italics Added) (Ex. 5)
The foregoing extension of ti1ne was granted giving
Applicant to and including March 11, 1953, which was
the end of the first fourteen years following approval
of the original application. Thereafter, the Bureau of
Reclamation completed its final survey and investigation
of the Gooseberry Project and published its report dated
January, 1953, recommending the Gooseberry Project
'~as a participating project in the Colorado River Storage Project." (Ex. 14). In a letter, dated January 15,
1953, to the Commissioner from the Regional Director
appears the following statement:
11
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"This report is submitted for your approval
and as a basis for appropriate action to secure
congressional authorization of the Gooseberry
project in central Utah as a participating project
in the plan for the Colorado River Storage project. The Gooseberry project was among the first
developments recommended by States of the Upper Colorado River Basin for participation in
the benefits and revenues of the storage project."
(Ex. 14, p. 1)
Inasmuch as the time for proving up on Application 9593 would expire on March 11, 1953, a further
request for extension of time was filed by Applicant
in which it was again stated:
"It is proposed to complete construction of
a dam on the Gooseberry Creek, at an estimated
cost of approximately $2,000,000.00, the project
to be tied in as a participating project with the
projects on the Colorado River and the Central
Utah Project from a financial and administrative
standpoint; if these projects are not developed
within the next few years, 1"t is proposed to complete the dam and tunnel in cooperation w~th the
Utah Water and Power Board. Bills for the
construction of the Colorado River Projects and
the related and participating projects are currently being introduced into the 1Wtional congress." (Ex. 6) (Italics added)
In connection \vith the filing of the foregoing request
in March of 1953, Applicant considered the over all problem before it and \vhat \Vould be done in the event that for
any reason the proposal of the Bureau of Reclamation
to include the Gooseberry project in the Upper Colorado
River progran1 \vould be rejected by Congress and no
appropriation made. It was determined that should such

12
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an eventuality occur, the Sanpete interests would proceed
on their own initiative with the assistance of the Utah
Water and Power Board to construct the Gooseberry
Reservoir at the site originally selected and which had
been maintained in effect through the extensions of time.
(R. 151-152, 182-183) Therefore, in submitting the application for an extension of time, the letter of transmittal
acco1npanying the written Request, written by Ralph
Blackham, President of Sanpete Water Users Association, advised the State Engineer that "Inasmuch as the
Gooseberry Project has been included in the Upper Colorado River Report to Congress we feel we are entirely
justified in asking that an extension of time be granted
on the enclosed application."
Since the request filed in 1953 was for additional
time beyond the first fourteen years, it was necessary
under Section 73-3-12, U.C.A. 1953, for the State Engineer
to publish notice of the request for such extension In
order to allow interested parties to file a protest.
It is significant that no one protested this request
for additional time even though notice of the same was
given to Appellants and even though the request was
couched in language clearly indicating that additional
time in Yvhich to complete the project would be necessary
if the Gooseberry Project as a part of the Upper ·Colorado
River development was not "developed within the next
fe"\v years." Nor did the State Engineer in granting the
extension of time give any indication that Applicant was
not entirely justified (as pointed out by Mr. Blackham)
in tieing the project into the Colorado River development.
Neither did he suggest that if the over-all Colorado River

13
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development was delayed it would not be possible to obtain further extensions of time to complete the dam and
tunnel in cooperation with the Utah Water and Power
Board.
The matter was submitted to Congress in the form
of proposed legislation which would have authorized
the construction of the Gooseberry Project as a part of
the Upper Colorado River Project but the funds were
not appropriated for such purpose. It is significant that
while the proposed legislation was pending in Congress,
hearings were held and protests were made by Appellants
in this action to the proposed appropriation. (See Exs. 18
and 19). Although Applicant had cooperated with Carbon
County groups to construct the Scofield Dam with public funds (the dam costing approximately $1,000,000.00 of
which Carbon County paid $100,000.00) Appellants in
this matter failed to support the Gooseberry Project when
it came up for consideration before the ·Congress of the
United States. Although some of Appellants at first
wrote letters approving the proposed appropriation, they
later actively opposed the san1e and sent representatives
to Washington to appear before Congressional committees in opposition thereto. (R. 146, 1-±7)
Even though the appropriation 'vas not made by
Congress, Public Law 485 ":hich "\Yas passed in the 84th
Congress, Second Session (Approved April11, 1956) referred the matter back to the Secretary of the Interior
for the purpose of making a further planning report. (Ex.
24) Between the time of the deletion of the Gooseberry
Project from the Appropriations Bill and the passage of
Public Law 485, representatives of the Sanpete ''Tater

14
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Users Association met with Governor George D. Clyde
(then Director of the Utah Water and Power Board) to
deter1nine \vhat further action might be taken in order
to insure the construction of the Gooseberry Project. (R.
185). Concern was expressed over whether or not further
extension of time would be granted to prove up on the application unless immediate action were taken to commence
construction. However, Mr. Clyde advised the representatives of Sanpete that it was his firm belief "that in case
of a show down, the application to appropriate covering
this 15,000 acre feet of water would be extended becaust~
he believed that due diligence had been exercised in the
attempts of the Sanpete County Water Users to consumate this project. Matters beyond their control arose to
interfere and therefore, they shouldn't be penalized for
these conditions." (Ex. 26) He went on to point out that
Applicant should permit further investigation by the
Bureau of Reclamation and as a consequence it was
concluded:
"That ~fr. Clyde would verbally discuss this
matter with 1\tfr. E. 0. Larson and urge him to
begin immediately the further investigations of
the Gooseberry Project which would include not
only a ne"T study of water supply on the Price
River and all of its tributaries but the present
uses of water and the lands on which water is now
being utilized and the water requirements in the
Price River area. Mr. ·Clyde would prepare a written recommendation to the Board that they continue their support of the Gooseberry Project and
request the Bureau of Reclamation, officially if
necessary, to immediately proceed with the investigations necessary to a revision of the Gooseberry
Project proposal." (Ex. 26)

15
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The investigation was completed by the Bureau of
Reclamation and its report submitted to Jay Bingham,
Director of the Utah Water and Power Board, under date
of September 19, 1957. (Ex. 15) While the report concludes that the Gooseberry Project at the "Narrows"
site was economically feasible (having a benefit cost ratio
of 1.5 to 1) the Bureau pointed out that it would not be
possible to go ahead with further studies "until we are
assured of a settlement between the conflicting issues of
the Price River and Sanpete areas."
Immediately after receiving the information contained in the supplemental report of the Bureau of Reclamation, Applicant filed with the Utah Water and Power
Board an application for a loan with which to commence
construction of the tunnel. (Ex. 28) It hired a competent
engineer to proceed to prepare plans and specifications
for the tunnel work and has pursued its efforts to get
actual construction on the tunnel started but again has
met with strong opposition from Appellants which has
delayed actual construction. (R. 154-175) At the request
of the engineer in charge, preliminary excavation work
was done in March of 1958 and as further evidence of its
good faith additional expense has been incurred for engineering since then. (R. 189-192) According to the testimony of Richard C. Hansen, the engineer employed by
Applicant, final plans and specifications for the tunnel
could be completed within a relatively short period of
time so that contracts for construction could be let before
the expiration of the extension of tin1e granted by the
State Engineer. (R. 175)
During the ti1ne that the Bureau of Reclamation has
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been surveying and preparing for the construction of the
Gooseberry Project, it has expended a total of $100,099.28
(Ex. 11) through 1\tlarch 31, 1959. Since the Bureau did
not have any filings of its own on the Gooseberry Project
site, its survey vvork and investigation was done under
Application 9593. (R. 118) In addition to the expenditures by the Bureau of Reclamation, the Utah Water and
I)o-vver Board fro1n J nne, 1948 to April, 1959, has expended $3,894.41 (Ex. 25). Applicant itself has spent several
thousand dollars as set forth in Exhibits 5 and 6, including
the an1ount spent since the report of the Bureau was given
in September, 1957. (Ex. 15) The amount of the expenditures by the Applicant are also set forth in the testimony
of Keith Hansen and shown by Exhibit 29.
STATE1fENT OF POINTS
Appellants have set forth three issues which they
submit to the Court for consideration. In addition to
those issues, Respondents maintain that there are tvvo
issues \vhich are equally as important and which if determined adversely to Appellants will resolve the matters
before the Court. As determined by Respondents, the
follo,ving are the issues in this case which will be argued
in the order listed:
POINT I
APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO PROTEST THE
DECISION OF THE 8TATE ENGINEER BECAUSE THEY
CANNOT BE AFFE·CTED BY SUCH DECISION.
POINT II
APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO PROTEST 'THE
DECISION OF THE STATE ENGINEER BECAUSE THEY
DO NO'T COME INTO COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS.

17
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POINT III
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE
FINDING OF DUE DILIGENCE.
POINT IV
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFI·CIENT TO SUSTAIN THE
FINDING OF REASONABLE CAUSE FOR DELAY.
POINT V
THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANTS ARE NO·T ENTITLED TO PROTEST THE
DECISION OF THE STATE ENGINEER BECAUSE THEY
CANNOT BE AFFE·CTED BY SUCH DECISION.

Section 73-3-12, U.C.A., 1953, authorizes any "person
interested" to file a protest to the granting of a request
for an extension of time. "Interested" means more than
having a casual concern as a member of the public, but
implies that it should be someone who has been or may
be adversely affected by the granting of the request someone who has a subsequent Application for appropriation which cannot be prosecuted until completion
of the \vork on the prior appropriation or "\vho may have
his application denied because of a prior application
which is not diligently prosecuted to completion. The
language of the statute relating to appeals from the decision of the State Engineer supports this view. Section
73-3-14, U.C.A. 1953, states that any person "aggrieved"
by the decision may appeal to the district court.
In the case of Brou,ghton' s Estate v. Central Oregon
Irrigation Distri,ct, 165 Or. 435, 101 P.2d 425, the Supreme
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Court of Oregon discussed what was meant by the term
''interested party" in connection with the right of a person
to protest an application for extension of time to prove
up on inchoate water rights. The court held that where
the "interested party" involved would be in a position
to make use of and appropriate the water such party
was interested and could protest the granting of the extension. Appellants here are not "interested parties"
within the purview of the above decision, first because
they have assigned away their rights under Application
9594 and other rights to the Federal Government and
second because the basis of their contention is that there
is insufficient water available to satisfy all existing
rights.
The Federal Government holds applications to appropriate the waters of Gooseberry Creek and surrounding tributaries of the Price River which are prior applvcati·ons to any of those of Appellants so that in the event of
the failure of Applicant to prove up on Application 9593
such applications would be first in right. It therefore
appears obvious that appellants are not "interested" in
the matter as contemplated by the statute. (R. 118,119, Ex.
13) The Bureau of Reclamation has not objected in any
way to further extensions of time to assist Applicant
in proving up on its Application. The Bureau has at all
times cooperated with Applicant and rendered assistance
in surveying, planning, and even attempting to obtain
funds with which to construct the dam and works. As
testified by Mr. Parley R. Neeley, Engineer for the Bureau of Reclamation, the Bureau had no water filings
of its own on the "Narrows" site so that in connection
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with its investigations and survey work "the Bureau of
Reclamation was relying on the application owned by the
Sanpete County interests." (R. 118)
Mr. 1\J eeley testified, and the evidence otherwise discloses, that for many years the Gooseberry Project has
been tied into Upper Colorado River development not only
by activity but by actual contract between the Carbon
County Water Users and the Bureau of Reclamation by
the Tri-partite agreement of 1944. (Ex. 13) By this
agreement, in which the Sanpete vVaters Users are the
third party beneficiaries, the Carbon County Water
Conservancy District and Price River \Vater Conservation District assigned to the United States certain water
filings, including Application No. 9594 for the appropriation of ninety thousand acre feet of water (from Gooseberry Creek) so that there could be no claim subsequently
made that water users in Carbon County would be adversely affected by the construction of the Gooseberry
Project. (Exh. 23) Since the execution of that a"greement
the Bureau of Reclamation has spent thousands of dollars
in engineering and survey studies. The evidence in this
case is that since the last extension of tin1e $22,833.83 has
been spent, making a total expenditure through nfarch
of 1959 of $100,099.28. (Ex. 11) The direct results and
benefits of this work have been for the purpose of establishing the feasibility of the Gooseberry Project and
preparing for the actual construction thereof. All of this
work and particularly that part relating to the engineering and survey of the tunnel and dam site inures to the
benefit of Applicant here and has been made available
to the Engineer who is preparing the plans and specifica~
20
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tions for the tunnel. (R. 157-165)
If, as Appellants contend, there is not sufficient
water to satisfy all of the prior rights of the Appellants
and at the saine time allovv sufficient water to be stored
to satisfy the rights of the Applicant under 9593 there
surely would not be any reason to suppose that there
would be sufficient water to satisfy the application of the
Bureau of Reclamation under 9594 for an additional
90,000 acre feet before any subsequent clams of Appellants would be affected. Obviously, Applicant does not intend to encroach upon prior, valid and subsisting rights.
For the foregoing reasons Applicant submits that Appellants are in no position to appeal from the ruling of the
State Engineer or the decision of the lower court, since
they cannot be affected by such determination.
POINT II
APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO PROTEST 'THE
DECISION OF THE STATE ENGINEER BECAUSE THEY
DO NOIT COME INTO COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS.

In outlining the proceedings for revievv of the decisions of the State Engineer our statute, Section 73-3-15,
provides that :
"The pleadings, practice and procedure in
suits to review decisions of the state engineer shall
be the same as in other equity cases. The hearing
in the district court shall proceed as a trial de novo
and shall be tried to the court as other equitable
actions."
A well-known equitable maxim which has application
to the facts in this case is "he who comes into equity must
come with clean hands." This maxim signifies that a
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party will be denied relief in equity on the ground that
his conduct has been inequitable. Expressed another way
"he that has committed inequity shall not have equity."
(See 19 Am. Jur., EQUITY, Sec. 469, p. 324). Thus in
the Broughton's Estate Case, supra, the Court held "because of having hindered the Broughton's Estates in the
development of their inchoate water rights, the irrigation
district is not now in a position to complain of the delay."
The evidence in this case clearly demonstrates the
inequitable conduct of Appellants in attempting to defeat
the development of the Gooseberry Project after having
received the cooperation of the Sanpete County interests
to construct the Scofield Dam upon the express understanding that the Gooseberry project would be next completed. Indeed some of the Appellants now before this
c·ourt filed with George D. Clyde Letters of approval
to be submitted to the Congressional Committee investigating the matter. Thereafter the same parties attempted
to retract said letters of approval and appeared before
the Congressional committee in opposition to the contemplated appropriation. (See Exs. 18 and 19)
POINT III
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE
FINDING OF DUE DILIGENCE.

At the ouset, we wish to point out to the Court that
the State Engineer has already ruled that Applicant has
shown "diligence or reasonable cause of delay" as that
term is used in Section 73-3-15, U.C.A. 1953. Likewise,
the trial court after a trial de novo of the 1natter has
determined that:
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"7. ·The said determination and order of the
defendant state engineer granting an extension of
titne was and is supported by the evidence and
should be affinned except as hereinafter indicated.
'~8.

Under all the facts and circumstances in
this case, defendant Sanpete Water Users Association has shown reasonable diligence in proceeding
to prove up on its application and to put the water
to beneficial use.
"9. The court further finds that said Sanpete
Water Users Association has shown reasonable
cause for delay in constructing the entire works
and diverting the water to the lands in Sanpete
County." (R. 27)
In the light of the foregoing we call the Court's attention to the principle which it has enunciated from time
to time to the effect that this Court will not disturb a finding of the lower court "unless it was clearly against the
weight of the evidence or unless the court has misapplied
the principles of law or equity." Heiselt v. Heiselt (1960)
349 P.2d 175. See, also, Clotworthy v. Clyde, 1 Utah 2d
251, 265 p .2d 423.
What constitutes diligence or reasonable cause for
delay must be determined upon the facts in each particular case. So states Wiel on Water Rights as follows :
"What constitutes dihgence. must be determined on the facts of each case. It is a question
of fact for the jury. In an early case the court
says that the following statements, among others,
are an accurate statement of the law: 'In appropriating unclaimed water on public lands only
such acts are necessary, and only such indications
and evidences of appropriation are required as
the nature of the case and the face of the country
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will admit of and are under the circumstances and
at the time practicable.' 'In determining the question of the Plaintiffs' diligence in the construction
of their ditch, the jury have a right to take into
consideration the circumstances surrounding them
at the date of their alleged appropriation, such as
the nature and climate of the country traversed
by said ditch, together with all the difficulties of
procuring labor and materials necessary in such
cases.'" (1 Wiel, Water Rights in the Western
States, 3rd Edition, Sec. 383.) (Italics added.)
A very good statement on \vhat generally constitutes
diligence is found in 2 Kinney on Irrigation and Water
Rights, 2nd Edition, Sec. 735, p. 1269, as follows:
"Probably the best definition of the word
diligence was given by Le-wis, C. J., in rendering
the opinion in an early Nevada case. It is there
defined as 'the steady application to business of
any kind, constant effort to accomplish any undertaking.' 'It is the doing of an act or series of acts
with all possible expedition, -with no delay except
such as may be incident to the work itself.'

"As has been said, the law does not require
any unusual or extraordinary efforts, but it does
require that wh.ich is usual, ordinary, and reasonable. The diligence required in the prosecution
of the construction of all \vorks necessary for the
diversion and application of water in an attempted
appropriation of the same is that constancy or
steadfastness of purpose or labor \Yhich is usual
with men engaged in like enterprises, and who
desire a speedy acco1nplishment of their designs.
There must be such assiduity in the prosecution of
the "rorks as will 1nanifest to the \Yorld a bona
fide intention to con1plete it \vithin a reasonable
time. As to "rhat constitutes diligence is a question
of fact and must be determined from all the cir24
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ctnnstances surrounding each particular case."
Section 736, discusses how reasonable diligence is
ascertained:
""As to whether the work of construction was
begun within a reasonable time after the notice
was given of the intent to appropriate water, and,
after its commencement, was prosecuted with all
reasonable diligence, are questions of fact to be
determined from all the circumstances surrounding each particular case, as the same are disclosed
by the evidence. And upon this question there
may be taken into consideration the acts of the
appropriators such as surveys, stakes set, and
the blazing of trees, the time of the commencement
of the work and its actual prosecution until the
same is completed. In other words, as was said by
the Oregon Court: 'The appropriator is entitled
to a reasonable time withjn which, by ordinary
diligence, he may complete the project and actually
apply the water to the useful purpose intended.
What is reasonable, both as to the amount of
water and as to the time any given project may be
completed, must depend upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case.'
"The climate of the part of the country where
the appropriation is attempted is also a proper
subject, upon the question as to whether the work
can be prosecuted during all the year, or only for
a portion of the year; also the topography of the
country "\Vhere the works have to be constructed
and through which the canal has to run, as to
whether the same be level or rough, and whether
the soil is easy to work or whether rock work is
encountered, and the like. So, also, the difficulty
of obtaining labor, tools, or material; also the extent and magnitude of the works themselves. The
financial standing of the parties attempting the
25
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appropriation, arnd their ability to raise the means
to prosecute the work to completion, are also
facts for consideration. Evidence of any of these
facts are proper in the determination of the question as to whether or not reasonable diligence has
been exercised in the construction of the works
necessary to divert and conduct the water attempted to be appropriated to the place where it is
to be used.'' (Emphasis added)
Various cases have also involved the problem of what
is a reasonable time in which to develop water projects.
In Seaward v. Pacific L-ivestock Company, (1907), 49 Or.
157, 88 Pac. 963, at p. 965, the Court had this to say:
"What is a reasonable time in which to apply
water originally intended to be used for some
beneficial purpose depends upon the magnitude
of the undertaking and the natural obstacles to be
encountered in executing the design."
Also see Oliver v. Skinner, 190 Or. 423, 226 P.2d 507,
where the problem involved a prior appropriator attempting subsequently to increase his appropriation, alleging
it was a part of the original plan. While the Court denied the claim, it did set do\Yn a guide as to the length
of time one might have to co1nplete his appropriation.
Quoting from 226 P.2d 507:
"The appropriator is, of course, allowed a
reasonable time to complete the application of the
appropriated water to the c.ontemplated beneficial
use. What constitutes such reasonable time depends largely upon the size of the project. . .. "
In Campbell v. Wyorning Develop1nent Co., 55 Wyo.
347, 100 P.2d 124 suit was brought by various individuals
to quiet title to water rights against the development
company. In holding for the defendant \vhich had taken
26
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a long time in developing the project the court observed:
"The water u1ust be used for a beneficial purpose within a reasonable time. But what is such
time depends upon the circumstances in each case,
and particularly ~tpon the magnitude of the enterprise and the difficulties encountered." (Italics
added.)
And again:
"The courts ought not, we think, take it upon
themselves to declare that the right of gradual
development was taken away from the defendant
company as a matter of law by the mere fact that
the development was slow . . ."
A Federal District Court case from the State of
vVashington indicates the various activities which will
constitute diligence. See United States v. Big Bend
Transit Co., 42 F. Supp. 459.
A good Utah case on the authority of the State
Engineer to extend time for proving up on applications
is In ReApplication 7600 to Appropriate. 30 Second Feet
of Water, (1924) 63 Utah 311, 225 Pac. 605. That case
involved the question of whether or not the State Engineer n1ay grant an extension of time to an applicant
for an appropriation of water under the limited statutory
provision which existed at that time after he has once set
a time in which all appropriation work must be completed. The ·Court concluded that good reasoning would
demand that the State Engineer be permitted to grant
extensions of time beyond the date originally set.
In commenting on the ability and judgment of the
State Engineer, the Court at page 608 of 225 Pac. had
this to say:
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"That the state engineer is a competent judge,
and probably more competent to determine the
necessity for extending the time than anyone else,
from the very nature of his position, ought to be
conceded without serious question. Such has been
his practice under the present statute since its enactment in 1919. That reasonable extensions from
time to time are necessary is clearly shown in the
record before us. In his letter addressed to C. W.
Morse, to which reference has been made, he sta-tes
the fact to be that during the three years next
preceding the trial in the district court he had
found it necessary on account of financial conditions to extend the time in 75 per cent of the applications filed in his office. In the very nature of
thi:ngs it is impossible for the engineer to foretell
in advance just how long it wiJll require to complete
the work and put the water to a beneficial use."
(Italics added.)
It is also interesting to note that over the years the
statutes of this state have been revised to a considerable
extent; and it appears that each revision has been for the
purpose of easing the burden on the appropriator of
water. At the time the above case was decided (1924) the
statute provided that the state engineer could grant
reasonable extensions within a 1± year period; however,
an applicant was compelled to apply to the District Court
for an extension of time beyond 14 years. (La"'S of Utah
1919, Chap. 67, Sec. 52) Now an applicant 1nay submit
requests for extensions of time to the state engineer after
the 14 year period; and the state engineer is authorized
to grant extensions for periods ''"'hich total up to 50 years.
Later, 'vhen the above case "Tent back to the Supreme
Court for a determination on the merits as to whether
or not the applicants had prosecuted their work diligently
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and as to whether or not their project was practicable
(73 (Ttah 50, 272 Pac. 225), the Supreme Court upheld
the district court in affirming the state engineer's decision
to grant an extension of time. Among other things the
Court concluded that it was not error to allow testimony
to co1ne into the record concerning the expense and time
spent on construction of pipes and laterals to bring waters
from nearby Granite Creek into the proposed reservoir
site, as "\vell as expense and time spent in constructing
works, which woud carry the water from the proposed
reservoir to the lands to be irrigated ; that such evidence
was material to show that work under a different application, to appropriate water from Red Cedar Creek, had
been prosecuted with due diligence when the waters from
Red Cedar Creek would also be diverted into the reservoir site. The opinion did not state what other work, jf
any, had been done directly on Red Cedar Creek.
As to the conclusiveness of the engineer's decision,
the Court had this to say:
"Evidence justifying or authorizing the court
to hold that the state engineer had abused his discretion in granting an extension, in our judgment,
should be quite conclusive to the effect that the
party asking for the extension was not entitled
thereto." ( 272 Pac. at p. 227)
Extensive research on the subject has failed to disclose any lTtah case where the court has reversed the decision of the state engineer in granting an extension of
time. As "\Ve view the law, the purpose of the changes
in the statute was to enlarge the power of the engineer
to grant longer periods of time in which applicants might
prove up on water filings.
29
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It is very significant in this rna tter to note that the
statute in question, 73-3-12, U.C.A., 1953, was amended
as late as 1947, said amendment providing the state engineer with authority to grant extensions of time on construction of work and application of water to beneficial
use up to a period of fifty years. Prior to the amendment,
the limit of the state engineer's authority to extend was
forty years. It is a fundamental principal of statutory
interpretation that the intent of the legislature must be
followed where the intent is clearly present. It is obvious
from this fairly recent amendment that the legislature
for the State of Utah anticipated long periods of time
which would be necessary to develop water resources
beneficially in this area. Certainly there should be no exception to the present case.
Appellants rely upon the case of Rio Puerco Irrigation Co. v. Jastro, 19 N.J\1. 149, 141 Pac. 874, as involving
a statute "similar to ours.'' Appellants quote a portion
of Section 29 of the New Mexico statute but fail to quote
Section 35 of the same statute which gave the engineer
power to extend the tin1e on construction for three and
two years respectively and further limited the extensions
to the ground of "physical and engineering difficulties.~'
By Section 35 the engineer is obligated to allo\v an extension of time equal to the time during which work was
prevented by operation of la\Y or other cause beyond the
power of the applicant to control. A cursory examination
of these provisions "Till clearly distinguish theN ew Mexico procedure and law from that outlined by our statute.
Section 73-3-12, lT:C.A. 1953, provides for an extension of time up to fourteen years 1nerely upon a suffi30
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cient showing by affidavit. From fourteen to fifty years,
extensions may be granted, but only after notice and hearing. It would seem entirely unfair and unreasonable to
compare a statute which specifically provides for three
and two year extensions and one providing for up to fifty
years extension of time by the state engineer. It should
also be noted that the New Mexico case was decided solely
on the question of whether or not the appropriators' financial inability to proceed with the project as planned
was good grounds for an extension of time by the State
Engineer. The case held that it was not. However, all
the courts are not in agreement on this point and there
are decisions which appear to be in conflict. See I Wiel,
Water R~ghts in the United States, 3rd Edition, Sec. 383,
p. 413:
"Upon the point of delay because of pecuniary
inability the decisions seem to conflict. In California, Nevada, and Oregon, lack of funds will
not excuse delay; but it seems otherwise in Colorado and Idaho."
In the case of Pool v. Utah County Light and Power
Co., et al., 36 Utah 508, 105 Pac. 289, our Supreme Court
commented on the power vested in the state engineer to
grant extensions of time:
"The purpose of vesting such powers in the
state engineer seems apparent enough. The statute fixes a final limit which applies to all applications alike. Some applications however, like the
one in question, require a large expenditure of
money and a considerable time before the appropriation can be perfected by the full completion
of the contemplated works. In order therefore,
to hasten the completion of the works as fast as
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possible, the engineer is authorized to fix a limit
much less than the statutory limit. He also is
authorized to fix a limit in accordance with the
magnitude of the work."
Appellants also cite the case of Maricopa County
MuniciJpal Water Conservancy DistriJct v. Southwest
Cotton Co., 39 Ariz. 65, 4 P.2d 369. Not only were the
facts substantially different in that case but as in the
other cases cited by Appellants where extensions of time
were refused, the Supreme Court affir1ned the decision
of the lower court or the state engineer which had denied
the application for an extension. In the ~1aricopa County
Case, supra, defendants' predecessor in interest had during the year 1888 initiated some appropriation of water
from the river and expended money thereafter in construction of diversion dam and canal. However the diversion dam and canal were practically destroyed and all
work stopped in 1895. Fro1n that time until approximately 1925, the only work done in furtherance of the rights
was the maintaining of a watchman and the expenditure
of some $25,000.00 for surveys and attorney fees. It will
be noted that over 37 years had elapsed bet,veen the time
of the commencen1ent of the appropriation until the further work was to be done in 1925. In the present instance,
Applicant had had less than 20 years from the date of the
approval of its application and under a statute which authorizes extensions of time up to 50 years.
We cannot see how the case of Sieber v. Frink, 7 Colo.
148, 2 Pac. 901 has any bearing on the issues of this case
except to define the doctrine of "relation back." The court
there said:
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'~To

acquire a right to water from the diversion thereof, one must, within a reasonable time,
employ the same in the business for which the
appropriation is made. What shall constitute such
reasonable time is a quest~on of fact depending
upon the circttmstances connected with each particular case." (Italics added.)
Again, in the case of In Re Whi~te River, 155 Or. 148,
G:2 P.2d 22, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the state engineer denying a third extension of
time where the state engineer had imposed terms and
conditions for an extension of time which had not been
complied with. As stated by the Supreme Court, Appellants had "wholly failed to comply with the terms and
conditions under which the extension had been made"
so that the decision of the state engineer refusing further
to extend the time was affirmed. Indeed, we may state
·without fear of contradiction that there are no cases in
which the Supreme Court has reversed the lower court or
the State Engineer in granting an extension of time in
"\vhich the prove up on an application for appropriation of
\Yater "\Vhere such extension of time was granted upon
the sho,ving of diligence or reasonable cause for delay.
Appellants claim that no plan has been adopted by
Applicant for the construction of the Gooseberry Project.
This is entirely contradictory to the evidence adduced in
the case. Not only have plans been prepared for the
project but the actual details for the construction of the
tunnel at the Gooseberry or "Narrows" site have been
heretofore made and revision of those plans and details
could be made in sufficient time to have the matter submitted to bid within six months, according to the testi33
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mony of the private engineer, Richard C. Hansen. (R.
174) In fact, as testified by l\1r. Hansen, not many projects are started with more preliminary work than we now
have on the Gooseberry Project. (R. 171) While there is
no actual detail on the construction of the reservoir dam,
such detail is not significant at this time since that will
be a matter of further development of the project and, as
testified by Mr. Hansen, his work was primarily concerned with the immediate project of getting the tunnel
detail prepared. (R. 169, 170)
Appellants attempt to confuse the issue by stating
that there are two plans which are being alternately proposed. As far as the record in this case is concerned,
the only plan which has been proposed and planned by
the Applicant is the Gooseberry site. While it is true
that the Bureau of Reclamation has endeavored to obtain
funds to construct a larger dam and reservoir at the
"l\1ammoth" site, this plan was not the plan of Applicant.
Applicant merely allowed the Bureau of Reclamation
to proceed with its survey and recommendation between
1949 and 1953 until the program was submitted to Congress for appropriation. The construction of the reservoir and tunnel at the Gooseberry site will, in the opinion
of the witnesses for Applicant, cost less than approximately $700,000.00 not the $2,204,000.00 suggested by
Appellants in their Brief. (R. 163, 196)
It is true as stated by Appellants that Applicant is
relying not only upon its O\Vn activity but upon the activity of the Bureau of Reclan1ation in cooperation with
Applicant to support a showing of diligence as well as
reasonable cause for delay. We 1nake no apology for such
34

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

activity. As a matter of fact, many of the reclamation
projects in the \Vest would have been not only infeasible
but in1possible had it not been for the cooperation between local agencies and the Federal Government, and
the financial assistance supplied by the latter. Nor is it
with apology that Applicant states it has hoped to obtain
Federal assistance in the construction of this project.
Surely Appellants do not apologize for having induced
the Federal Government to construct the one million dollar Scofield Dam in return for One Hundred Thousand
Dollars to be paid by Appellants. This project would have
been indefinitely delayed and may never have been built
but for such financial aid and the willingness of Applicant
to forego its immediate claims for Gooseberry for the
over all benefit of the·Carbon County interests.
vVe respectfully submit that the evidence is sufficient
to sustain the finding of the court that Applicant has used
due diligence in connection with its application.
POINT IV
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFI·CIENT TO SUSTAIN THE
FINDING OF REASONABLE CAUSE FOR DELAY.

What has heretofore been said as to the evidence
with respect to showing diligence applies equally to the
evidence as to reasonable cause for delay. Surely the
statement of facts clearly demonstrates reasons why
.A.pplicant has not proceeded with construction of the
tunnel andjor the reservoir prior to this time. In fact,
what has been stated with respect to the interference
by Appellants with the program for financing the construction of the project sufficiently demonstrates that
Applicant has reasonable cause for delaying the con35
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struction. Nor does the question of "feasibility" have
anything to do with the matter. As heretofore stated
the feasibility of the project was established not only
in the 1953 report of the Bureau of Reclamation but
likewise in the supplemental report issued September,
1957. (Exh. 15) Like\vise, Mr. Neeley, who has had
more experience than any other person in the accumulation of the data and information preliminary to the
construction of the Gooseberry project, testified that
in his opinion the project was economically justified
at this time. (R. 122) Appellants rely upon a statement
contained in Exhibit 33 at page 77 wherein Mr. Templeton, author of this publication, attempted to give his
opinion as to the effect upon existing water rights if
the Gooseberry project were built. We wish to point
out that at the time this exhibit was introduced in evidence the exhibit vvas offered "only as to the factual
matter contained in it, including resumes of many water
applications and including a copy of the l\1orris Decree
on the Price River and a copy of various court proceedings with respect to a water right known as the
mammoth reservoir site." Based upon that statement
of counsel and upon the statement that the court could
receive it pro forma and consider it for what it would
be worth, the exhibit \vas received in evidence. (R. 218,
219) Obviously, the conclusion. of l\1r. Templeton concerning the relative 1nerits of the \Vater rights of the
respective parties is not an issue in the case. Of more
significance is the testilnony of Appellants' witness,
Lawrence C. Monson \Vho testified that there was 71,999
acre feet of water allocated to Carbon County under
the Morse decree and that there \Vere only approxiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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mately 7,920 acres of land to be irrigated which would
indicate 9.3 acre feet of water per acre of land. (R.
229, 230)
Likewise Mr. Monson testified that the Bureau of
Reclamaton in its land survey studies in 1956 and 1957
had determined that under the Price River there were
only 2353.7 acres of good productive land in Carbon
County, approximately 8,440.1 of fair productive land,
and 1,896 acres of poor yield making a total of 13,189.8
acres of arable land in Carbon County with an allocated water right of some 71,000 acre feet. (R. 231)
Likewise, some of the water previously used for irrigation has been sold to the Utah Power and Light
Company and other industrial consumers and yet the
number of acres of land under irrigation has apparently
increased without increasing the amount of appropriation. (R. 229)
We respectfully submit that under the facts of this
case, the Court was justified in determining and finding
that Applicant had reasonable cause for the delay which
it has encountered over the years since 1939 in submitting proof on its application.
POINT V
THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JUDGMEN·T.

Respondents have no dispute with Appellants a8
to the law with respect to the requirement that findings
of fact are necessary. However, as indicated by Appellants in their brief, the court found the ultimate facts
to the effect that Applicant has "shown reasonable
37

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

diligence in proceeding to prove up on its application
and to put the water to beneficial use." Further, the
court found that Applicant has "shown reasonable cause
for delay in constructing the entire works of diverting
the water to the lands in Sanpete Valley." Both of
these matters are matters of ultimate fact and not
conclusions of law. True, the court did not go into the
evidentiary facts which support the ultimate facts found
by it; but Rule 52 (a) U.R.C.P. does not require either
the pleading or the finding of evidentiary facts. Although the proposed findings were submitted to the
court and served upon opposing counsel prior to the
time they were signed, and although counsel made a suggested change which was adopted by the Court (see typographical change which appears on the third line of the
Judgment, R. 31) no claim was made that the findings
were insufficient or that the findings as made did not set
forth the ultimate facts in dispute between the parties.
We respectfully submit that the findings of the court
which sustain the decision of the state engineer are
adequate and sufficient in the instant matter and that
no prejudice has resulted to Appellants because of any
brevity therein.
SUMMARY
Respondents respectfully submit to the Court that
Appellants do not have any right or standing in this
court to question either the decision of the State Engineer or the decision of the District Court for the reason
that they are not "interested" parties as defined by
Section 73-3-12 U.C.A., 1953 or "aggrieved" as defined
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by Section 73-3-14 U.C.A. 1953. In any event, the de-

cision of the State Engineer as affirmed by the trial
court is supported by the evidence and this Court on
review should not disturb the decision of the lower court.
Respectfully submitted,
ARTHUR H. NIELSEN
510 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
WALTER L. BUDGE
Attorney General of Utah
Attorneys for Respondents
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